J. L. Mackie (1955, p. 200), for example, claimed. Another argument goes: God exists. by an ancient philosopher by the name of Epicurus. The theist understands that evil, pain, and suffering are contrary to the opposite “good” states – The “way it should be.” The essential point of the Free Will Defense is that the creation of a world containing moral good is a cooperative venture; it requires the uncoerced concurrence of significantly free creatures. How can God be omnipotent and not stop evil? Suppose that the persons in this world can only choose good options and are incapable of choosing bad options. 1990. The problem is that he can’t do anything about it because he’s not omnipotent. `` Logical Problem Of Evil `` By Lee Strobel 1377 Words 6 Pages Seems like each day we turn on our televisions, open up our Internet browsers or turn on our smartphones we’re confronted with some disturbing news of people doing unimaginable acts to each other, to animals, to our planet or horrible things happening to people all across the globe. Denying the truth of either (1), (2), (3) or ( 4) is certainly one way for the theist to escape from the logical problem of evil, but it would not be a very palatable option to many theists. Plantinga’s Free Will Defense has been the most famous theistic response to the logical problem of evil because he did more to clarify the issues surrounding the logical problem than anyone else. Since (MSR1) and (MSR2) together seem to show contra the claims of the logical problem of evil how it is possible for God and (moral and natural) evil to co-exist, it seems that the Free Will Defense successfully defeats the logical problem of evil. It is believed that God is all-powerful and all-loving, yet evil exists. Hick rejects the traditional view of the Fall, which pictures humans as being created in a finitely perfect and finished state from which they disastrously fell away. (37) God is not able to make significantly free creatures and to causally determine that they will always choose what is right and avoid what is wrong. The ‘Incompatibility’ or ‘Logical’ versions of the Problem of Evil claim that evil’s existence is logically incompatible with God’s existence: believing in God and evil is like believing in a five-sided square, a contradiction. Many theists maintain that it is a mistake to think that God’s omnipotence requires that the blank in the following sentence must never be filled in: According to orthodox theism, all of the following statements (and many more like them) are true. Based on the old logical problem of evil which has been addressed since a long time ago, I have certain objection to its premise. (15) also doesn’t say anything about plausibility. The logical version of the problem of evil (also known as the a priori version and the deductive version) is the problem of removing an alleged logical inconsistency between certain claims about God and certain claims about evil. An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any intense suffering it could, unless it could not do so without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse. God, it seems, is incapable of doing anything wrong. The potential of the various theodicies is inadequate for their attempt to account for evil in term of good, which are a misinterpretation of evil to some good and the misrepresentation of God’s nature through the endorsement of good to God. Although Plantinga claimed that his Free Will Defense offered merely possible and not necessarily actual reasons God might have for allowing evil and suffering, it may be difficult for other theists to embrace his defense if it runs contrary to what theism says is actually the case in heaven. We can start by granting Plantinga the possibility of trans-world depravity. (18), combined with the assumption that God does not have a morally sufficient reason for allowing evil, yields. Although sketching out mere possibilities without giving them any evidential support is typically an unsatisfactory thing to do in philosophy, it is not clear that Mackie’s unhappiness with Plantinga is completely warranted. As an example, a critic of Plantinga’s idea of “a mighty nonhuman spirit” causing natural evils may concede that the existence of such a being is not logically impossible but argue that due to lacking scientific evidence for its existence this is very unlikely and thus it is an unconvincing explanation for the presence of natural evils. If God eliminated the evil, he would have to eliminate the greater good as well. If God had no morally sufficient reason for allowing evil, then if we made it to the pearly gates some day and asked God why he allowed so many bad things to happen, he would simply have to shrug his shoulders and say “There was no reason or point to all of that suffering you endured. The worlds described will be possible if the descriptions of those worlds are logically consistent. But Plantinga thinks he is mistaken in thinking that W3 is possible and in not recognizing important differences between W3 and W4. He reasons as follows. is the contradictory of (40). This article addresses one form of that problem that is prominent in recent philosophical discussions–that the conflict that exists between the claims of orthodox theism and the facts about evil and suffering in our world is a logical one.
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